The Gates of Eden by Lasch, Christopher
Review
The Gates of Eden
Christopher Lascht
The Greening of America. By Charles A. Reich. New York, Random
House, 1970. Pp. 399. $7.95.
That a would-be disturber of the political peace should reach
hundreds of thousands of readers ought to be a matter for rejoicing.
Unfortunately Reich's criticism of American life, for all his obviously
good-hearted intentions, does not cut very deep. It can be accepted
without any profound unsettling of existing habits of thought. In many
ways the book reinforces those habits and thereby deepens our con-
fusion instead of helping to dispel it.
Reich has said that he wished to explain the young to their troubled
parents, and it is dear that it is parents, not the young, who are buying
and reading The Greening of America and finding in it not so much a
clear explanation of the youth revolt-which in its rejection of tradi-
tional individualism Reich does not even understand-as a reassurance
that things are working themselves out in the best possible way. It
seems that the "kids," for all their bluntness and unpredictability, have
caught a vision of a brighter future. After all they are only trying to put
into practice their parents' ideals. They "accept" those ideals; what they
object to is merely "their parents' failure to live these same ideals."'
By taking seriously the old American dream, the younger generation
has initiated a bloodless revolution. "It will not be like revolutions of
the past"-those decadent old-world revolutions in which men fought
passionately over politics, used swords and guns against each other, and
shook the social order to its foundations, incidentally causing bitterness
and suffering. Our revolution "will not require violence to succeed, and
it cannot be successfully resisted by violence." Already it is "spreading
ith amazing rapidity, and already our laws, institutions and social
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structure are changing in consequence."2 The change goes deeper than
merely political change. Compared with the youth upheaval, "a mere
revolution, such as the French or the Russian, seems inconsequential-
a shift in the base of power." Those who look to politics for change,
Reich believes, do not understand "the crucial importance of choosing
a new life-style."3
There is something incorrigibly American about the illusion that
great changes can take place without a great price having to be paid for
them. In belittling the revolutions of the past, Reich tries to wave away
the pain and suffering that necessarily accompany a genuine social trans-
formation. Because he chooses to remain ignorant of history-substitut-
ing for historical analysis a diagrammatic sketch of the development of
three stages of "consciousness"-he blinds himself to a fact that no one
interested in changing American society can afford to ignore: precisely
because change is painful, people have to be desperate in order to risk
it. Bad as things are, the prospect of chaos is usually worse. That is one
reason advocates of change have to offer programs of their own, and not
merely programs but a coherent social vision, a new culture. Even then,
masses of people will not risk the uncertainties of revolutionary change
unless they have come to the point of having nothing left to lose.
For Reich, however, it is enough for people simply to choose new
"life-styles." Reich sees revolution as something that begins with indi-
viduals; this too is very American. The sense of history as a collective
undertaking is entirely foreign to American individualism. For this
reason Americans are uneasy with politics, a collective expression.
"Politics" signifies corruption, compromise, deals; true statemanship is
"above" politics, or entirely outside it. Reich shares this ingrained
American suspicion of politics. He dismisses the belief that change
comes through changing institutions as an attribute of an outmoded
"consciousness"-"Consciousness II" (as distinguished from "Con.
sciousness I"-laissez-faire liberalism-and "Consciousness III"-the
youth revolt). Both socialists and liberals suffer from the disease of
Consciousness II. They still believe in politics.
Consciousness III, on the other hand, knows that politics is a snare
and a delusion. It understands that "the controlling factor" in history
"is consciousness. ' 4 It knows that "we can make a new choice whenever
we are ready to do so. We can end or modify the age of science and we
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can abandon the Protestant ethic."" We can begin the revolution right
now by growing our hair. "Can anyone doubt that [long hair] will reach
all the men in our society within a few years?" It is in comparison with
such momentous transformations that "mere revolution" seems "incon-
sequential."
Reich belongs to a long evangelistic tradition in the United States,
a tradition that regards social life-insofar as it regards social life at all
-as the product of innumerable "choices" made by individuals.
Brother, repent! "[T]he central fact about Consciousness III [is] its
assertion of the power to choose a way of life."' Marx, we are told, made
the mistake of thinking that "consciousness is determined by material
interests."" What Marx actually said was that "social existence" deter-
mines consciousness-that "legal relations," for example, "could
neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called
general progress of the human mind," but "are rooted in the material
conditions of life."9 Thought does not exist in a vacuum. Men make
their own history, since society itself, while rooted in biological neces-
sity, is largely the creation of human culture; but men make history
within limits set by the history they have already made. Marx knew that
without a demonstration that the material basis of socialism had been
created by the conditions of bourgeois society itself, his criticism of
capitalism would remain disembodied and would carry no more weight
than any other kind of moral exhortation.
Not so with Reich. He interprets the revolt of the affluent young, and
the fact that it is opposed by the working class, to mean that conscious-
ness is a matter of personal assertion, particularly in a stage of social
development at which "the economic ceases to be of primary concern
in men's lives."10 Only in America could this kind of statement pass for
social criticism. Never mind the distortion of Marx. One does not have
to be a Marxist to see that the collective provision for man's material
needs-food, shelter, reproduction of the species-is the basis of social
life, or that a rising standard of living (greatly exaggerated by Reich in
any case) does not suddenly make those questions irrelevant or even of
less than "primary concern." Of course men also need culture-a rich
structure of meanings that makes sense of experience. But culture can-
5. P. 305.
6. Pp. 330-31.
7. P. 354 (emphasis in the original).
8. P. 508.
9. K. ALux, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in KAM
MAXAX & FaREmcK ENGEI. S E.crE Wonrs 181 (1968).
10. Pp. 308-09.
867
The Yale Law Journal
not be regarded as a matter of individual "life-styles." It is a collective
creation, itself deeply influenced by the ways in which society organizes
the production of material needs. A society that leaves production to
"private enterprise" will get a culture to match, one characteristic of
which is precisely the tendency to see culture as the product of private
choice. In this respect Reich is truly a man of his times.
Advocates of change, one would suppose, would find it necessary to
understand the distribution of power in the United States. Has the basis
of power changed? Has the possession of property lost its political im-
portance? Has a managerial class replaced the capitalists? These are
questions of great complexity and importance, with which serious
students of American society have been engaged for some time. Instead
of wrestling with them, Reich accepts the cliches of pop sociology and
draws from them the comforting picture of a society that can be altered
through acts of individual will. Since "there is no class struggle; today
there is only one class" and since "there is no longer any ruling class
except the machine itself," we are all free, even millionaires (especially
millionaires?), to choose "liberation instead of the plastic world of
material wealth" and to exchange "wealth, status and power for love,
creativity, and liberation.""
Reich's diagnosis of what is wrong with American society, like his
conception of the way in which everything that is wrong will be righted,
consistently overestimates the importance of "individual freedom."
Reich is quite correct in asserting that what is wrong cannot be under-
stood merely as economic deprivation. "The real question for the
worker just as for the black man, is 'who am I? what sort of culture
should I have.. .?' "12 This statement contains an important insight, but
it should not obscure the fact that economic deprivation still exists;
nor should it be taken to mean that cultural questions are not class
questions at the same time. The issue for workers, and for Americans
in general, is: what kind of culture should we have? Even here, Reich's
formulation of the issue still suffers from the assumption that culture is
a matter of private choice. His principal indictment of American society
is not that it tolerates alarming levels of poverty or destroys the environ-
ment or makes interminable war against other peoples, still less that it
fails to project a coherent world-view, but that it interferes with personal
freedom. The "system," with its "false consciousness" (another empty
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office worker, free speech to the G.I., long hair to the high school
student.13 It inhibits the "search for self."' 4 Advertising creates a de-
mand for leisure, for tropical vacations, and "sensuality," which it can-
not satisfy-and this disparity between expectations and reality in turn
engenders revolt. Without pausing to consider what social groups have
an interest in preserving the present arrangements--he prefers to talk
vaguely of "forces"--Reich expounds at great length on the decline of
personal "satisfactions:" "adventure," "travel," "sex,". "nature,"
"growth, learning, change," "responding to own needs" ("staying in bed
when the need is felt, drinking a milk shake on a hot afternoon, or
stopping everything to watch a rainstorm"), "wholeness," "sensuality,"
"new feelings," "expanded consciousness," "affection," "community,"
"brotherhood," "liberation."'1
Three points need to be made about this catalogue. In the first place,
an efficiently organized industrial system can tolerate a wide range of
private satisfactions, providing they remain private. Hence a demand
for more "satisfactions" is hardly a revolutionary program. In the
second place, the demand itself reflects a pinded and meager concep-
tion of the good life, one that owes much to advertising and travel
brochures-embodiments of the very culture Reich professes to deplore.
Finally, as we have already had occasion to note, Reich has no concep-
tion of social life or culture that goes beyond the individual. He ob-
serves that the industrial system-since it often gives the impression of
running out of human control-denies us the satisfaction of "creating
an environment," but he defines this purely in personal terms: "Taking
whatever elements are given, natural, human, and social, and making a
unique pattern out of them as one's own creation."10 Once again we
see how the progressive educator's ideal of individual "creativity"
blunts the edge of any radical critique of American culture, which
would have to begin with a recognition that "creating an environment"
is a collective undertaking, and that it is precisely the collective decision
to create a more humane environment-as opposed to personal he-
donism-that the industrial system as presently constituted cannot
tolerate.
One more example will suffice to show how Reich personalizes and
therefore trivializes every issue that he takes up. At one point he de-
plores the university's obsession with scholarly "productivity." A more
IS. P. 282.
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serious critic would proceed to an analysis of the body of scholarship
produced by current conditions. He might try to show that the flood of
scholarly monographs in no way enriches our understanding and in fact
impedes the necessary work of theory and synthesis. He might also try
to show that much of this work is ideological in content, serving to
legitimate existing social relations. Instead, Reich objects that writing
scholarly books is rarely a "creative" experience for the individuals
engaged in it.17 This completely misses the point: it is precisely because
the activity does offer genuine pleasure that there is so little disposition
to criticize the institution that makes it possible, the modern university.
As long as the university allows us to "do our own work," we ask no
questions of it. The real problem of academic life is not how to find
private satisfactions but how to create a community of scholars. More
teaching and less research-Reich's solution-is a trite and hollow
formulation that obscures the underlying question of what we are to
teach.
The prevailing social and cultural conditions in the United States
are far too grim to allow us to be diverted by instant radicals, with-it
professors, and Pollyannas of whatever ideological persuasion. A
threadbare garment of individualism, optimism, and evangelical en-
thusiasm cannot take on new splendor by being decked out with love
beads.
17. See pp. 176-77.
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